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Abstract
We introduce a game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between a cyber insurance policyholder
whose premium depends on her self-reported security level and an insurer with the power to audit the security level
upon receiving an indemnity claim. Audits can reveal fraudulent (or simply careless) policyholders not following reported
security procedures, in which case the insurer can refuse to indemnify the policyholder. However, the insurer has to bear
an audit cost even when the policyholders have followed the prescribed security procedures. As audits can be expensive, a
key problem insurers face is to devise an auditing strategy to deter policyholders from misrepresenting their security levels
to gain a premium discount. This decision-making problem was motivated by conducting interviews with underwriters and
reviewing regulatory filings in the US; we discovered that premiums are determined by security posture, yet this is often
self-reported and insurers are concerned by whether security procedures are practised as reported by the policyholders.
To address this problem, we model this interaction as a Bayesian game of incomplete information and devise optimal
auditing strategies for the insurers considering the possibility that the policyholder may misrepresent her security level.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first theoretical consideration of post-incident claims management in cyber
security. Our model captures the trade-off between the incentive to exaggerate security posture during the application
process and the possibility of punishment for non-compliance with reported security policies. Simulations demonstrate
that common sense techniques are not as efficient at providing effective cyber insurance audit decisions as the ones
computed using game theory.
Keywords: Game theory, Cyber insurance, Economics of security, Premium discount, Post-incident audit, Security
1. Introduction
No amount of investment in security eliminates the risk
of loss [1]. Driven by the frequency of cyber attacks, risk-
averse organizations increasingly transfer residual risk by
purchasing cyber insurance. As a result, the cyber-insurance
market is predicted to grow to between $7.5 and $20 billion
by 2020, as identified in [2].
Similar to other types of insurance, cyber-insurance providers
pool the risk from multiple policyholders together and
charge a premium to cover the underlying risk. Yet cyber
risks like data breaches are qualitatively different from tra-
ditional lines like property insurance. For instance, build-
ings are built once according to building regulations, whereas
computer systems continually change as mobile devices
blur the network perimeter and software evolves with addi-
tional product features and security patches. Adversaries
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update strategies to exploit vulnerabilities emerging from
technological flux.
Further, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion become more pressing. Adverse selection results from
potential clients being more likely to seek insurance if they
face a greater risk of loss. Meanwhile, information asym-
metry limits insurers in assessing the applicant’s risk. The
risk depends on computer systems with many devices in
different configurations, users with a range of goals, and
idiosyncratic organizational security teams, policies, and
employed controls. Collecting information is a costly pro-
cedure, let alone assessing and quantifying the correspond-
ing risk.
Moral hazard occurs when insureds engage in riskier be-
haviour in the knowledge that the insurer will indemnify
any losses. Even if initial assessment reveals that secu-
rity policies are in place, it is no guarantee that they will
be followed given that “a significant number of security
breaches result from employees’ failure to comply with se-
curity policies” [3]. Technological compliance suffers too,
as evidenced by the Equifax breach resulting from not
patching a publicly known vulnerability [4].
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Insurance companies collect risk information about appli-
cants to address adverse selection. We interviewed 9 un-
derwriters in the UK and found that 8 of them use self-
reported application forms; 7 of them use telephone calls
with the applicant; 3 of them use external audits; and only
one uses on-site audits1. This suggests that the application
process relies on accurate self-reporting of risk factors. Cy-
ber insurance application forms collect information about
questions ranging from generic business topics to questions
related to information security controls [5].
Romanosky et al. [6] introduced a data set resulting from a
US law requiring insurers to file documents describing their
pricing schemes. Pricing algorithms depended on the ap-
plicant’s industry, revenue, past-claims history, and—most
relevant to this paper—the security controls employed by
the organization. The insurer collects all this information
and sets a price according to the formulas described in [6],
reducing the premium when security controls are reported
to be in place. This was corroborated by interviews with
insurance professionals in Sweden [7]. Surprisingly, indi-
vidual underwriters determine the size of the discount for
security controls on a case-by-case basis, even though this
can be as large as 25% of the premium.
Moral hazard is generally addressed by including terms
in the policy that insureds must follow for their coverage
to be valid. An early study found that coverage was ex-
cluded for a “failure to take reasonable steps to maintain
and upgrade security” [8]. A study from 2017 found few
exclusions prescribing security procedures but the major-
ity of policies contained exclusions for “dishonest acts” [6].
One such dishonest act is violating the principle of up-most
good faith requiring insureds to not intentionally deceive
the company offering the insurance [9].
This principle and the corresponding exclusion mitigates
moral hazard, which might otherwise drive honest firms to
de-prioritize compliance with security procedures. Further,
it imposes a cost on fraudulent organizations claiming that
entirely fictional security products are in place to receive
a lower premium. For example, one insurer refused to pay
out on a cyber policy because “security patches were no
longer even available, much less implemented” [10] despite
the application form reporting otherwise. We do not con-
sider the legality of this case, but include it as evidence
that insurers conduct audits to establish whether there
are grounds for refusing coverage.
Further, insurers offer discounts for insureds based on se-
curity posture and often rely on self-reports that secu-
rity controls are in place. Interviewing insurers revealed
concerns about whether security policies were being com-
plied with in reality. Besides, larger premium discounts
increase the incentive to misrepresent security levels po-
tentially necessitating a higher frequency of investigation
1Note that these are mutually inclusive events.
which is uneconomical for insurers. To explore how often
should insurers audit cyber insurance claims, we develop a
game-theoretic model that takes into account relevant pa-
rameters from pricing data collected by analyzing 26 cyber
insurance pricing schemes filed in California and identifies
different optimal auditing strategies for insurers. Our an-
alytical approach relies on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). We complement our analysis with simulation re-
sults with parameter values from the collected data. We
further make “common sense” assumptions regarding au-
diting strategies and show that in general, insurers are
better-off with the game-theoretic strategies. The results
will be of interest to policymakers in the United States
and the European Union, who believe cyber insurance can
improve security levels by offering premium discounts [11].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 identifies existing approaches to modeling the cy-
ber insurance market. We introduce our game-theoretic
model in Section 3 and present the analysis in Section 4.
Section 5 details the our methodology for data collection
which instantiate our simulation results. Finally, we end
with concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Related Work
This paper continues the trend towards rectifying the “sub-
stantial discrepancy” [12] between early cyber insurance
models and informal claims about the insurance market.
Early research considered factors relevant to the viability
of a market. Interdependent security occurs when the risk
“depends on the actions of others” [13, 14]. Optimists ar-
gued that insurers could coordinate the resulting collective
action problem [15, 16], leading to a net social welfare gain
and a viable market. Skeptics instead focused on the “high
correlation in failure of information systems” [17, 18, 19],
citing it as a major impediment to the supply of cyber
insurance. Recent empirical work [6] analyzing 180 cyber
insurance filings shows that the cyber insurance market is
viable.
Beyond viability, researchers explored how insurers can in-
tervene by sharing information, assessing the security of
service providers, and investing in software quality. The
insurer sharing information about claims data was shown
to increase social welfare in [20]. Khalili et al. [21] show
that underwriting service providers improves both insurer
profit and social welfare. Laszka et al. [22] found that the
insurer directly investing in software quality can “reduce
non-diversifiable risks and can lead to a more profitable
cyber insurance market”.
The timing of the insurer’s intervention plays is an impor-
tant strategic aspect. Ex-ante interventions for the insurer
include risk assessments and security investments before
the policy term begins. Shetty et al. [23] investigated an
insurer who could assess security levels perfectly or not at
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all, concluding that the latter cannot support a function-
ing market. Majuca et al. [24] showed that ex-ante assess-
ments in combination with discounts for adopting security
controls can lead to an increase in social welfare. A more
recent model introduces stochastic uncertainty about the
policyholder’s security level [25].
None of these adverse selection studies consider the poten-
tial for insureds to misrepresent their security posture. Al-
lowing malicious insureds to “subvert insurer monitoring”
in both the application process and over the policy period
was studied in [26]. The analysis showed that no cyber in-
surance market could exist. However, we know from [10]
that insurers audit insureds and refuse coverage for fraud-
ulent claims. Our model deviates from [26] by allowing
the insurer to audit claims and withdraw coverage if the
insured misrepresents information.
Beyond ex-ante assessment, insurers make decisions re-
garding ex-post claims management. These decisions have
received less attention. The impact of secondary losses on
the policyholder’s incentive to claim could lead to over-
priced products [27]. Further, insurers can aggregate claims
information to increase social welfare [20]. Empirically it
has been suggested insurers will refuse “claims arising from
the insured’s failure to maintain security levels”, but the
strategic aspects of insurers investigating the incidents lead-
ing to claims has not been considered [8].
The literature on economic theory of insurance fraud has
developed two main approaches: costly state verification
and costly state falsification [28]. The costly state falsifi-
cation approach assesses the client’s behaviour towards a
claim. We consider the costly state verification approach,
which focuses on the insurer identifying fraudulent claims.
The insurer can verify the claims via auditing but has to
bear a verification cost. The optimal claim handling usu-
ally involves random auditing [29].
Our contribution to the literature is the first theoretical
consideration of post-incident claims management. Our
model captures the trade-off between the incentive to ex-
aggerate security posture to receive a premium discount
and the possibility of punishment for non-compliance with
the reported security policies. We consider misrepresent-
ing security posture a strategic choice for the insured and
allow the insurer to respond by auditing claims. Not al-
lowing the insurer to do so leads to market collapse [26].
3. Model
We model the interaction between the policyholder P and
insurer I as a one-shot dynamic game called the Cyber
Insurance Audit Game (CIAG), which is represented in
Figure 1. Each decision node of the tree represents a state
where the player with the move has to choose an action.
The leaf nodes present the payoffs of the players for the
sequence of chosen actions. The payoffs are represented in
the format
(
x
y
)
, where x and y are the payoffs of P and
I, respectively. Table 1 presents the list of symbols used
in our model. Note that the initial wealth of the policy-
holder (W ) and the premium for insurance coverage (p)
are omitted from the tree for ease of presentation.
Table 1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description
a Cost of audit
c Security investment cost
d Discount on premium for better security level
l Loss due to a breach
p Premium for the insurance coverage
W Initial wealth of the policyholder
β Probability of a breach
β∗ Probability of a breach after investment
We assume that the policyholder does not make a deci-
sion regarding its security investment in our model, be-
cause that decision has been made before seeking insur-
ance. Hence, a particular applicant has a certain fixed type
(with respect to security), but the insurer does not know
the type of an applicant due to information asymmetry.
We can model the insurer’s uncertainty by assuming that
it encounters certain types of applicants with certain prob-
abilities. The type of the policyholder is modeled as an
outcome of a random event, that is, nature (N) decides
the policyholder’s type with respect to additional security
investments, i.e., PS represents one with additional secu-
rity investments and PN one without. Further, nature also
decides whether a security incident occurs for each policy-
holder, represented as B (breach) and NB (no breach).
The probability of an incident depends on the type of the
policyholder.
Nature moves first by randomly choosing the policyholder’s
type according to a known a priori distribution: PS with
probability Pr(PS) = ϕ and PN with probability Pr(PN ) =
1−ϕ, ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. The type is private to a policyholder and
the insurer knows only the probability distribution over the
different types. Hence, the game is of incomplete informa-
tion. Regardless of the types, the policyholder’s actions are
CD (claim premium discount) and NC (no discount claim).
Nature then decides the occurrence of the breach on a pol-
icyholder, followed by the insurer’s decision to audit (A)
or not audit (NA) only in the event of a breach. We as-
sume that in CIAG, an audit investigates the misrepresen-
tation of the cyber security investment and the claim for
receiving a premium discount. In particular, it investigates
whether the policyholder had indeed invested in cyber se-
curity countermeasures before claiming this discount. Our
model does not assume that there is a particular type of
audit.
Having described the players and actions, in the following
we present the interaction between P and I. First, P has
signed up for a cyber insurance contract by paying a pre-
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Figure 1: Extensive form representation of the Cyber Insurance Audit Game (CIAG) with the Nature deciding the types of policyholder and
the occurrence of an incident.
mium p. The type of P is decided by the nature based on
an additional security investment. We assume that this in-
vestment equals c. This investment will decrease the prob-
ability of P being compromised from β to β∗.
At the same time the investment will enable P to claim
a premium discount d. We assume that I offers d with-
out performing any audit since investigating at this point
would mean that I would have to audit policyholders who
might never file an indemnity claim, thereby incurring
avoidable losses.
We further assume that if P decides to claim a discount
without making the security investment, she will still re-
ceive d but risks having a future claim denied after an
audit. After an incident, where P suffers loss l, insurer I
has to decide whether to conduct an audit (e.g. forensics)
to investigate details of the incident including the security
level of P at the time of breach. We assume that this audit
costs a to the insurer. This audit will result in:
Case 1: confirming that P has indeed invested in security
as claimed, in which case I will pay the indemnity.
We assume full coverage so the indemnity payment
equals l.
Case 2: discovering that P has misrepresented her security
level, I refuses to pay the indemnity and P has to
bear the incident cost l. We assume that this case
falls within the contract period during which P is
locked-in by the contract. We define misrepresenta-
tion as when P is fraudulent or simply careless in
maintaining the prescribed security level in the in-
surance contract and reports a fabricated security
level to get the premium discount.
In Figure 1, some decision nodes of I are connected through
dotted lines indicating that the I cannot distinguish be-
tween the connected nodes due to unknown P type. These
sets of decision nodes define the information sets of the
insurer. An information set is a set of one or more deci-
sion nodes of a player that determines the possible subse-
quent moves of the player conditioning on what the player
has observed so far in the game. The insurer also has
two information sets, one where the breach has occurred
to the policyholder who has claimed premium discount
CD= {(CD|PS), (CD|PN )} and the one where the breach
has occurred to the policyholder who has not claimed pre-
mium discount NC= {(NC|PS), (NC|PN )}. Each of the in-
surer’s information sets has two separate nodes since the
insurer does not know the real type of the policyholder
when deciding on whether to audit or not.
In outcome CD,B,A, the expected utility of the PS is
UPSCD,B,A = U(W − p+ d− c),
where U is a utility function, which we assume to be mono-
tonically increasing and concave, W is the policyholder’s
initial wealth, p is the premium paid to the insurer, d is
the premium discount, and c is the cost of the security in-
vestment. We assume the utility function to be concave to
model the risk aversion of policyholders as defined in [12].
Note that we assume that W > p > d and W − p+ d > c,
and both W and p are exogenous to our model.
UPSCD,B,A = UPSCD,B,NA = UPSCD,NB = U(W − p+ d− c) (1)
UPSNC,B,A = UPSNC,B,NA = UPSNC,NB = U(W − p− c) (2)
UPNCD,B,A = U(W − p+ d− l) (3)
UPNCD,B,NA = UPNCD,NB = U(W − p+ d) (4)
UPNNC,B,A = UPNNC,B,NA = UPNNC,NB = U(W − p) (5)
We further assume that the policyholder’s goal is to max-
imize her expected utility. The expected utility of the pol-
icyholder is influenced by the possibility of a breach and
the insurer’s probability to audit. In particular, the ex-
pected utility for PS will be the same regardless of the
insurer’s probability to audit and the breach probability
due to indemnification. PN , however, will need to consider
these probabilities.
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In the outcome PS ,CD,B,A the insurer’s utility is
UIPS,CD,B,A = p− l − d− a,
where p is the premium, d is the premium discount offered,
l is the loss claimed by the policyholder, and a is the audit
cost.
In other outcomes, the insurer’s utility is as follows:
UIPS,CD,B,A = p− l − d− a (6)
UIPS,CD,B,NA = UIPN,CD,B,NA = p− l − d (7)
UIPS,CD,NB = UIPN,CD,NB = p− d (8)
UIPS,NC,B,A = UIPN,NC,B,A = p− l − a (9)
UIPS,NC,B,NA = UIPN,NC,B,NA = p− l (10)
UIPS,NC,NB = UIPN,NC,NB = p (11)
UIPN,CD,B,A = p− d− a (12)
4. Decision Analysis
In this section, we analyze the equilibria of the proposed
Cyber Insurance Audit Game (Figure 1), which is a dy-
namic Bayesian game with incomplete information. The
analysis is conducted using the game-theoretic concept
of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). This provides in-
sights into the strategic behaviour of the policyholder P
concerning discount claims and the insurer I’s auditing
decision.
A PBE, in the context of our game, can be defined by
Bayes requirements discussed in [30]:
Requirement 1: The player at the time of play
must have a belief about which node of the informa-
tion set has been reached in the game. The beliefs
must be calculated using Bayes’ rule, whenever pos-
sible, ensuring that they are consistent throughout
the analysis.
Requirement 2:Given these beliefs, a player’s strat-
egy must be sequentially rational. A strategy profile
is said to be sequentially rational if and only if the
action taken by the player with the move is optimal
against the strategies played by all other opponents
given the player’s belief at that information set.
Requirement 3: The player must update her be-
liefs at the PBE to remove any implausible equilib-
ria. These beliefs are determined by Bayes’ rule and
players’ equilibrium strategies.
In the event of a security breach, the insurer’s decision to
audit or not must be based on beliefs regarding the poli-
cyholder’s types. More specifically, a belief is defined as a
probability distribution over the nodes within the insurer’s
information set, conditioned that the information node has
been reached. The insurer has two information sets sub-
jected to whether the policyholder has claimed premium
discount or not which are CD= {(CD|PS), (CD|PN )} and
NC= {(NC|PS), (NC|PN )}. The insurer assigns a belief to
each of these information sets. Let µ and λ be the insurer’s
beliefs where
µ = Pr(PS |CD)
λ = Pr(PS |NC)
That is, for the first information set, the insurer believes
with µ and 1−µ that the premium discount claim is from
PS and PN , respectively. Similarly, for the second infor-
mation set, the insurer believes with λ that PS has not
claimed premium discount and believes with 1 − λ that
PN has not claimed premium discount.
The first requirement of PBE dictates that Bayes’ rule
should be used to determine beliefs. Thus
µ =
Pr(PS) Pr(CD|PS)
Pr(PS) Pr(CD|PS) + Pr(PN ) Pr(CD|PN ) (13)
λ =
Pr(PS) Pr(NC|PS)
Pr(PS) Pr(NC|PS) + Pr(PN ) Pr(NC|PN ) (14)
From the payoffs in Figure 1, it can be clearly seen that
CD is always a preferred choice for PS . Whereas, the in-
surer always gets a better payoff for choosing NA against
NC irrespective of policyholder’s type. Having defined the
necessary concepts, next, we identify the possible PBEs of
the game for the following constraints
l > a and l > d (15)
l > a and l < d (16)
l < a and l > d (17)
l < a and l < d (18)
where the PBEs are strategy profiles and beliefs that sat-
isfies all the three requirements described earlier.
Theorem 1. For ϕ > l−al , l > a and l > d, CIAG
has only one pure-strategy PBE
(
(CD,CD),(NA,NA)
)
, in
which the policyholder claims premium discount regardless
of her type while the insurer does not audit regardless of
whether the policyholder claims or not a discount, with
µ = ϕ and arbitrary λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The existence of pure-strategy PBE can be verified
by examining the strategy profile (CD,CD) and (NA,NA)
with constraint in Equation (15). This represents the case
where an incident has occurred on the policyholders who
have claimed premium discount.
a) Belief consistency : Due to information asymmetry
and as only one of the insurer’s information set is
in the equilibrium path, she assigns Pr(CD|PS) =
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1 and Pr(CD|PN ) = 1. Thus, using Bayes’ rule in
Equation (13) gives
µ = ϕ/(ϕ+ 1− ϕ) = ϕ
On the other hand, applying Bayes’ rule in Equa-
tion (14) to λ yields 0/0 which is an indeterminate
result. This implies that if the equilibrium is actu-
ally played then the off-equilibrium information set
NC should not be reached restricting an update to
the insurer’s belief with Bayes’ rule. Due to an in-
determinate result, the insurer specifies an arbitrary
λ ∈ [0, 1].
b) Insurer’s sequentially rational condition given updated
beliefs: The expected payoff for each action of the in-
surer are
UA = ϕ · UIPS,CD,B,A + (1− ϕ) · UIPN,CD,B,A (19)
= ϕ(p− d− l − a) + (1− ϕ)(p− d− a)
= p− ϕl − d− a
UNA = ϕ · UIPS,CD,B,NA + (1− ϕ) · UIPN,CD,B,NA
(20)
= ϕ(p− d− l) + (1− ϕ)(p− d− l)
= p− d− l
The condition for A to be sequentially rational is
UA > UNA which gives
p− ϕl − d− a > p− d− l
ϕ ≤ l − a
l
= ϕ∗ (21)
Now considering the off-equilibrium information set
NC, the insurer always gets a better payoff by choos-
ing NA. Thus, NA is a dominant strategy of the in-
surer against the off-equilibrium information set NC.
The insurer’s belief λ remains arbitrary.
c) Policyholder’s sequentially rational condition given
insurer’s best response: Knowing the best responses
of the insurer i.e. (A,NA) for ϕ ≤ ϕ∗ and (NA,NA)
for ϕ > ϕ∗ against CD, we derive the best response of
the policyholder. For insurer’s strategy profile (NA,NA),
PS gets a payoff U(W −p+d−c) by choosing CD. If
she deviates to NC, she will get a payoff U(W−p−c)
which is undesirable. Whereas, PN receives a payoff
U(W −p+d) by choosing CD. If she deviates to NC
will get a payoff U(W −p) which is also undesirable.
Thus, (CD,CD) and (NA,NA) can be verified as a
PBE given ϕ > ϕ∗ and µ = ϕ. Note that the PBE
includes the updated beliefs of the insurer implicitly
satisfying Requirement 3.
From the PBE, we can see that if l > a, l > d and insurer’s
belief ϕ is greater than the threshold value ϕ∗, not audit-
ing a breach is optimal for the insurer and claiming pre-
mium discount is optimal for the policyholder regardless
of her type. When the insurer’s belief ϕ ≤ ϕ∗ there exist
no pure-strategy PBE. As a result, both players will mix
up their strategies. We discuss this mixed-strategy PBE
below. Note that, in the following, we use the inner tuple
(x, 1 − x) to indicate a mixed strategy where the player
chooses the first action with probability x and the second
action with probability 1− x.
Theorem 2. For ϕ ≤ l−al , l > a, l > d, CIAG has only
one mixed-strategy PBE, in which:
• PS will always prefer CD, while PN randomizes be-
tween CD and NC with probability δ and 1 − δ, re-
spectively;
• the insurer randomizes between A and NA with prob-
ability θ and 1− θ, respectively, against CD, and she
always prefer NA against NC, with her beliefs about
PS playing CD and NC being µ = ϕϕ+(1−ϕ)δ and
λ = 0, respectively, where
δ =
a
(1− ϕ)l
θ =
U(W − p+ d)− U(W − p)
β ·
(
U(W − p+ d)− U(W − p+ d− l)
) (22)
Proof. The existence of mixed-strategy PBE is outlined
below.
a) Belief consistency : Again we apply the Bayes’ rule.
By assuming that the policyholder sticks to the equi-
librium strategy, the insurer can derive that Pr(CD|PS)
= 1, Pr(NC|PS) = 0, Pr(PS) = ϕ, Pr(PN ) = 1− ϕ,
Pr(CD|PN ) = δ and Pr(NC|PN ) = 1 − δ. Using
Equations (13) and (14) we obtain µ = µ and λ = λ
in Equation (2).
b) Optimal responses given beliefs and opponent’s strat-
egy : Given these beliefs and the mixed strategy of
the policyholder, an insurer’s optimal strategy would
maximize her payoff. The insurer can achieve this by
randomizing her actions such that the expected pay-
offs is equal for all the actions of the policyholder.
This is known as the indifference principle in game
theory. Thus, the expected utility of PN for choosing
CD is
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UPNCD =β ·
(
θ · UPNCD,B,A + (1− θ) · UPNCD,B,NA
)
+ (1− β) · UPNCD,NB
=β · θ · U(W − p+ d− l)
+ β · (1− θ) · U(W − p+ d)
+ (1− β) · U(W − p+ d)
=β · θ ·
(
U(W − p+ d− l)− U(W − p+ d)
)
+ U(W − p+ d) (23)
and for choosing NC, where NA is a dominating
strategy of the insurer, is
UPNNC = β · UPNNC,B,NA + (1− β) · UPNNC,NB
= β · U(W − p) + (1− β) · U(W − p)
= U(W − p) (24)
The indifference principle requires that UPNNC = UPNCD ,
which gives
U(W − p) = β ·θ ·
(
U(W − p+ d− l)− U(W − p+ d)
)
+ U(W − p+ d)
θ =
U(W − p+ d)− U(W − p)
β ·
(
U(W − p+ d)− U(W − p+ d− l)
)
as in Equation (22). Similarly, the policyholder will
also mix her strategy with an aim to make the insurer
indifferent between choosing A and NA. Thus,
UIA = ϕ · UIPS,CD,B,A
+ (1− ϕ) ·
(
UIPNCD,B,A + UIPNNC,B,A
)
= ϕ
(
(1)(p− d− l − a) + (0)(p− l − a)
)
+ (1− ϕ)
(
δ(p− d− a) + (1− δ)(p− l − a)
)
= p− l − a− ϕd− δd+ δl + ϕδd− ϕδl (25)
UNA = ϕ · UIPS,CD,B,NA
+ (1− ϕ) ·
(
UIPNCD,B,NA + UIPNNC,B,NA
)
= ϕ
(
(1)(p− d− l) + (0)(p− l)
)
+ (1− ϕ)
(
δ(p− d− l) + (1− δ)(p− l)
)
= p− l − ϕd− δd+ ϕδd (26)
and UA = UNA gives
p− l − a− ϕd− δd+ δl + ϕδd− ϕδl =p− l − ϕd
− δd+ ϕδd
δ =
a
(1− ϕ)l
as in Equation (22).
We conceive all the possible PBEs for CIAG by exhaus-
tively applying this methodology over all combinations of
the players’ strategy profiles for the four constraints de-
scribed in Equations (15) to (18). Figure 2 presents the
solution space of CIAG. It further shows how the equi-
librium strategies of the players depends on the premium
discount (d), audit cost (a), and loss (l).
5. Model Evaluation
Our analysis in Section 4 provides a framework for insurers
to determine optimal auditing strategy against policyhold-
ers who can misrepresent their security levels to avail pre-
mium discounts. This section illustrates the methodology
used to obtain values for various parameters of our model
and simulation results using these values to determine the
best strategy for the insurer.
5.1. Methodology and Data Collection
A diverse set of data sources is needed to study the in-
teraction between insurance pricing, the effectiveness of
security controls, and the cost of auditing claims. To this
end, we combine the following data sources: a US law re-
quiring insurers to report pricing algorithms [6], analysis
of a data set of over 12, 000 cyber events [2], a study of the
cost and effectiveness of security controls [31], and a range
of informal estimates regarding the cost of an information
security audit.
The model assumes that nature determines incidents ac-
cording to a Bernoulli distribution with loss amount l and
probability of loss β. Analysis of the data set of 12, 000
cyber incidents reveals data breach incidents occur with
a median loss $170K and frequency of around 0.015 for
information firms [2], which we use as l and β respectively.
We adopt the security control model used in [31]. Both
fixed and operational costs are estimated using industry
reports, which correspond to c in our model. The effective-
ness of a control is represented as a percentage decrease
in the size or frequency of losses. For example, operating
a firewall ($2,960) is said to reduce losses by 80% [31]—
leading to a probability of breach after investment (β*) of
0.2β.
We downloaded all of the cyber insurance filings in the
state of California and discarded off-the-shelf policies that
do not change the price based on revenue, industry or se-
curity controls. This left 26 different pricing algorithms
and corresponding rate tables, the contents of which are
described in [6].
Data breach coverage with a $1 million limit was selected
because it is the default coverage and it comfortably covers
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Figure 2: Solution space of Cyber Insurance Audit Game (CIAG).
the loss value l for a data breach on SMEs. The premium
p and discount d varies based on the insurer. We chose a
filing explicitly mentioning discounts for firewalls. For an
information firm with $40M of revenue, the premium p is
equal to $3,630 and the filings provide a range of discounts
up to 25%. The exact value depends on an underwriter’s
subjective judgment. To comprise this we consider multiple
discounts in this range.
Estimating the insurer’s cost of audit (a) is difficult be-
cause they could be conducted by loss adjusters within the
firm or contracted out to IT specialists. With the latter in
mind, we explored the cost of an information security au-
dit. The cost depends on the depth of the assessment and
the expertise of the assessor. However, collating the quoted
figures suggests a range from $5, 000 up to $100, 000.
5.2. Numerical Analysis
We simulate the interaction between the cyber insurance
policyholder and the insurer based on our game-theoretic
model with parameter values described above. First, we
compare the expected payoffs of the insurer for different
strategic models:
1. the game-theoretic approach (GT) where the insurer
chooses an appropriate strategy according to our anal-
ysis (refer to Figure 2) and can either audit or not
audit;
2. always auditing (A,A) regardless of whether the pol-
icyholder has claimed discount or not;
3. always not auditing (NA,NA) regardless of whether
the policyholder has claimed discount or not;
4. auditing if the policyholder has claimed discount and
not auditing if there is no discount claimed (A,NA);
5. not auditing if the policyholder has claimed discount
and auditing if there is no discount claimed (NA,A);
6. auditing half the times regardless of whether the pol-
icyholder has claimed discount or not (0.5A,0.5A);
7. auditing half the times when the policyholder has
claimed discount and not auditing if there is no dis-
count claimed (0.5A,NA).
In the following simulation figures, the insurer’s average
payoffs with each strategic model are calculated against a
policyholder who plays the PBE strategy obtained through
our analysis. This policyholder is also the most challeng-
ing one for the insurer as it claims for a discount even in
the case of non investment. The term “x repetitions of the
game” reflects that CIAG is played x number of indepen-
dent runs for a set of parameter values.
From Figures 3a and 3b we observe that the payoff of
the insurer when choosing the GT model is always bet-
ter than rest of the strategic models irrespective of the
premium discount. The reason for this is that the model
(A,NA), where the insurer audits only policyholders who
have claimed the discount, is susceptible to auditing clients
who have implemented additional security level bearing
the auditing cost as a pure loss. Thus, the larger the num-
ber of honest policyholders, the higher the insurer’s loss is.
Additionally, the insurer’s loss as expected increases with
the increasing cost of audit. With the (NA,NA) model,
the insurer chooses to reimburse the loss without confirm-
ing the policyholder’s actual security level. Here, the in-
surer indemnifies even for cases where the policyholder has
misrepresented her security level suffering heavy losses.
Another non strategic approach would be to randomize
over the choice of auditing or not auditing a policyholder
who has claimed a premium discount. This strategy, repre-
sented by the model (0.5A,NA), gives a payoff within the
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range of payoffs from models (A,NA) and (NA,NA). The
results exhibit that models (A,A), (NA,A), and (0.5A,0.5A)
consistently performers poorly compared to other models.
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Figure 3: Insurer’s average payoff (in US dollars) with different
strategic models across various repetitions of the game for a me-
dian loss $170k, audit cost $5k with (a) premium discount 5% and
(b) premium discount 25%.
The GT model presents an optimal mix of (A,NA) and
(NA,NA) where the insurer’s decision to audit is based
on a prior belief regarding the policyholder’s security in-
vestment. For the median loss of $170k which is greater
than both the audit cost and premium discount, the game
solution is derived from the upper-right section of the so-
lution space in Figure 2. In particular, when the insurer’s
belief (φ) regarding the policyholder’s security investment
is greater than a threshold (ϕ∗), she prefers (NA,NA) i.e,
PBE 2:
(
(CD,CD),(NA,NA); ϕ > ϕ∗
)
. When the belief
is lower than ϕ∗, she prefers a mixed approach (PBE 3)
by simultaneously relying on (A,NA) and (NA,NA) and
choosing whichever is more profitable. The GT model,
thus, enables the insurer to take into account a prior be-
lief regarding the policyholder’s security investment under
the condition of information asymmetry and maximize her
payoffs given this belief. The figures further show that re-
gardless of how many times the game has been played
model GT performs better than the non-game-theoretic
models.
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Figure 4: Insurer’s average payoff (in US dollars) with different
strategic models across various repetitions of the game for a me-
dian loss $170k, audit cost $100k with (a) premium discount 5% and
(b) premium discount 25%.
With higher audit cost i.e., $100k in Figures 4a and 4b, we
observe that the insurer’s average payoff with the model
(A,NA) decreases drastically confirming it’s shortcomings
as discussed above. In the case of 1500 independent rep-
etitions for the highest values of audit cost and premium
discount, the insurer gains, on average, a higher payoff
when choosing GT as opposed to (NA,NA) model. The
increased difference in the payoff is equivalent to 98% of
the annual premium charged to policyholder.
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Figure 5: Insurer’s average payoff (in US dollars) with different strategic models for median loss $170k against audit costs with premium
discount (a) 5% and (b) 25% and against premium discount with audit cost (c) 5k and (d) 25k.
Remark 1: For constant loss, as premium discount in-
creases, GT consistently outperforms all other strategic
models for various repetitions of the game in both sets of
experiments with minimum and maximum values of audit
cost.
Next, the simulation results are obtained over 100 repeti-
tions with a median loss of $170k against a range of audit
cost, premium discount and loss. Note that the models
(A,A), (NA,A), and (0.5A,0.5A) are omitted from the fig-
ures as they perform worse than others, and for ease of
presentation.
Figures 5a and 5b show that there is a point of conver-
gence where the strategy largely doesn’t matter, but then
as the audit cost increases, there is motivation for playing
the game-theoretic solution as any other solution is worse.
As discount increases, a policyholder might be highly stim-
ulated to receive premium discount given that the insurer
will grant this without auditing her before an incident oc-
curs. This escalates the possibilities of the policyholder
misrepresenting her actual security level. Given this possi-
bility, GT noticeably dominates other strategic models as
seen in Figures 5c and 5d. Further, in the case of 100 in-
dependent repetitions with the highest values of premium
discount and audit cost, deploying GT gives the insurer on
average a higher payoff compared to the next best model
which is (NA,NA). The increased difference in the payoff
is equivalent to 60% of the annual premium charged to the
policyholder.
Remark 2: For a constant loss, as premium discount and
audit cost increase, GT outperforms all other strategic
models.
Figure 6 shows that there is essentially nothing special
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Figure 6: Insurer’s average payoff (in US dollars) with different strategic models against loss for various audit costs and premium discounts.
about the loss as a contributing factor with low audit cost,
but become discriminatory as the audit cost approaches
the loss. GT and (NA,NA) performs equally well until this
condition, but as the discount increases with the audit
cost, GT exceeds (NA,NA). In this case, for 100 indepen-
dent repetitions, insurers gain on average a higher payoff
with model GT, compared to model (NA,NA), the next
best. The increased difference is payoff is equivalent to
66% of the annual premium charged to the policyholder.
Remark 3: As premium discount, audit cost, and loss
increase, GT consistently outperforms all other strategic
models.
In summary, we have demonstrated how an insurer may
use our framework in practice to determine the best au-
diting strategy against a policyholder. We have illustrated
how the insurer’s payoff is maximized by strategically choos-
ing to audit or not in the event of a breach. Such strategic
behaviour also allows the insurer to maximize her payoff
against policyholders who can misrepresent their security
levels to avail premium discount.
6. Conclusion
Speaking to cyber insurance providers reveals concerns
about the discrepancy between the security policies appli-
cants report that they follow, in the application process,
and the applicant’s compliance with these policies once
coverage is in place. To address this, we developed a game-
theoretic framework investigating audits as a mechanism
to disincentivize misrepresentation of security level by pol-
icyholders. Thus far, we know of one instance [10] denying
cyber insurance coverage due to non-compliance with the
security practices as defined in the insurance contract. Al-
though there could have been denials settled in private,
this suggests that most cyber insurance providers follow
the never audit strategy. Our analysis derived a game-
theoretic strategy that outperforms na¨ıve strategies, such
as never audit. By considering the post-incident claims
management process, we demonstrated how a cyber insur-
ance market can avoid collapse (contradicting [26]) when
the policyholder can fraudulently report their security level.
To extend this paper, future work could consider modelling
uncertainty about the effectiveness of the implemented se-
curity measure. In the current model, the policyholder’s
type is chosen by Nature according to some probability
distribution. It could be extended such that the policy-
holder maximizes expected payoff by selecting an invest-
ment strategy based on the beliefs about her type. This
consideration would extend, for example, our analysis to
consider the overall utility function of the policyholder,
that is considering both the investment and no investment
types simultaneously, and maximizing the expected payoff.
Another interesting direction is investigating how the po-
tential loss l changes as a function of the security invest-
ment. In this case, we will be looking into different types of
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risk profiles of the policyholders. We could also investigate
the trade-off between the additional investment, discount,
and residual risk.
Finally, a future extension could make investment in secu-
rity a strategic choice for the policyholder in a multi-round
game with a no claims bonus, as our data set describes the
size of these discounts. We could also allow belief updates
to influence insurer choices on each iteration.
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